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Foreign direct investors increasingly use investment dispute-settlement mechanisms 
to resolve investment disputes and reduce political risk. 1  Using data from the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the major forum 
of international investment arbitration, we cataloged the government actors involved 
in disputes and the actions that led to arbitration. Existing case-based studies of 
investment arbitration have provided general inferences about the actors involved, but 
we contribute to the literature in political science and economics by systematically 
documenting these patterns of behavior. 
 
As of September 2013, ICSID tribunals had concluded a total of 264 investment 
disputes. Using ICSID case records, Lexis-Nexis news archives and other resources, 
we found sufficient descriptions of case facts to code the host country government 
actors and the alleged violations for 163 of the 264 concluded ICSID cases.2 The 
remaining cases were either dropped by the parties or there were insufficient 
published facts for us to identify government actors.  
 
Our main finding is that the majority of government decisions that lead investors to 
seek arbitration are associated with actions taken by the executive branch, which is 
consistent with theories on the role of the executive in disputes with foreign investors. 
We also show that there are fewer arbitrations in response to legislation or court 
decisions. This speaks to concerns that investment arbitration infringes on the 
sovereignty of host country governments.3  
 
Investment disputes arise for a number of reasons and result from the actions of many 
different government actors. Strikingly, there are only 14 cases of legislatures taking 
actions leading to disputes, many of which are initiated by the same legislatures 
engaging in multiple disputes in a single year. Jamaica’s decision to change tax rates 




A larger percentage of the disputes are related to the executive branch of government. 
There were 18 cases of heads of state or government engaging in actions that led to 
investment disputes, and 60 cases of ministry-originated conflicts with foreign 
investors. Given the strong relationship between heads of state or government and 
ministries in most countries, these were all coded as executive-branch disputes. 
Together, 48% of these disputes (and 47% of expropriations) were associated with the 
executive branch. 
 
The remaining disputes involved other government actors. In 14 cases, subnational 
actors (provinces, states, municipalities) were directly engaged in disputes, often by 
canceling contracts with multinational enterprises. Another 24 cases involved 
agencies that do not have ministry-level status. State-owned enterprises and courts are 
also active in a handful of disputes. 
 
 
Table 1.  Distribution of disputes as of September, 2013 
 All claims Expropriation claims 
Government actor Number Percent Number Percent 
Head of state or 
government 18 11 9 10 
Ministry 60 37 33 37 
Total executive branch 78 48 42 47 
   
  
Legislature 14 9 12 13 
   
  
Subnational 14 9 11 12 
State-owned firm 19 12 7 8 
Other agency 27 17 9 10 
Court 12 7 8 9 
Total 163  89  
Source: ICSID.org.  Claims sum to >100% due to rounding. 
 
The evidence yields two important insights for policymakers seeking to reduce risk 
for foreign investors. First, the most common actor associated with disputes is the 
executive.4 Thus, reforms that limit the discretion of the executive to interfere with 
foreign investment are likely to reduce investor-state claims and, more generally, may 
reduce political risk.5 Second, this prevalence of disputes originating from executive 
activity suggests that investor-state arbitration can serve as an additional external 
check on executive discretion, particularly where domestic checks are weak. Given 
the low rate of disputes involving legislative branch activity, arguments that investor-
state arbitration may encroach on the legitimate prerogatives of domestic 
governments appear to be overstated. Instead, democratic legislatures should embrace 
investor-state arbitration as an additional check on executive branch misbehavior. 
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